Of John Nash's two contributions to game theory, it is the concept of the equilibrium point that has been assessed as quintessential to economics. This can be attributed to the fact that it exemplifi es the dominant view among economists that the maximization postulate and the assumptions of perfect rationality and complete information have both normative and descriptive value. This reasoning, however, is not so readily applicable when it comes to the bargaining model proposed by Nash in the early 1950s. One discrepancy is, for instance, the removal of the time aspect that is a feature of the model, which greatly differs from the standard economic approach to bargaining. Moreover, and more generally, the set of axioms proposed by Nash to determine a solution to the bargaining History of Political Economy 40:1
game represented a major departure from the more commonly used pricetheoretical analysis. In spite of these divergences, Ariel Rubinstein (1982) extended Nash's model by restoring the passage of time, and today Rubenstein's approach represents the dominant research program in the theory of strategic bargaining. The course that this evolution has taken raises at least two questions. First, how did Nash's model gain popularity among economists? Second, why did the axiomatic approach displace alternative and concurrent ways of modeling bargaining processes?
These questions become even more compelling if we take into account the fact that bargaining theory is not presently a fl ourishing research area. This might be attributable to the widespread belief that the mainstream approach to strategic bargaining is too stylized to capture the richness of the real world (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991) . It has been argued that focusing on the fundamentals (Muthoo 1999 ) is usually justifi ed by the need to solve the simpler problems before seeking to tackle the more diffi cult ones (Binmore and Dasgupta 1987) . Indeed, the weaknesses of strategic bargaining models reveal how game theory often has little interpretative power when applied to empirically signifi cant matters (Kreps 1990) .
To provide some insight into these issues, this article analyzes the early contributions of John Harsanyi and Thomas C. Schelling. Although both scholars contributed to the foundations of the theory of strategic bargaining, their works were characterized by two very different methodological approaches. While Harsanyi aimed at selecting single solutions, developing deductive models, and fi nding conditions for static equilibrium, Schelling allowed for multiple outcomes, relied on intuition and empirical counterarguments, and made the dynamic features of the negotiation process explicit. A specifi c episode from the 1960s will help to explain the contrast in the work of the two. Criticisms addressed to Nash's axiomatic model by many reviewers had focused on the assumption of symmetry, which was judged more appropriate prescriptively than descriptively. Schelling and Harsanyi did not discuss this issue directly.
In an e-mail to the author on 8 January 2005, Schelling wrote:
Harsanyi and I overlapped at Yale University for about two years in the 1950s but we had little communication. That was partly because he was shy and reticent, partly I think because his English was not comfortable for him. I believe others had the same experience. I published an article, On the Abandonment of Symmetry in Game Theory in August, 1959, eighteen months after I had left Yale; I included it in my book, The Strategy of Confl ict, 1960 . It mainly targeted Harsanyi's work, but I am not aware that he paid any attention to it. We certainly did not correspond about it. I wish we had. That's about all I can tell you. I wish I had more.
However, Harsanyi discussed the axiom of symmetry in some papers that made explicit the contrast between his and Schelling's views on the methodology of economics. The analysis of this debate will show that in the early 1960s, when game theory had not yet entered the economists' toolbox, two distinct methods for linking strategic interaction and bargaining theory were proposed, although they were differently acknowledged later. Harsanyi actively contributed to defi ning a research program that subsequently was to lead to the dominant research model in economics, while Schelling's insights were further developed more by other social scientists than by economists. In order to better understand the course of these developments, it is helpful to describe the nature of the Harsanyi-Schelling disagreement on the assumption of symmetry and to discuss how it relates to later developments.
Section 1 below presents Harsanyi's (1956) proof and discussion of the equivalence between Nash's and Frederik Zeuthen's bargaining models. Section 2 outlines the main characteristics of Schelling's theory of confl ict. The different methodological approaches of Harsanyi and Schelling are compared in section 3, which points out their contrasting views on the axiom of symmetry. Conclusions are drawn in the fi nal section.
Harsanyi as the Interpreter of Nash's Bargaining Model
The main legacy of Harsanyi (1967-68) regarding the application of game theory to economics is the proof that any kind of uncertainty can be modeled in a Bayesian game. Prior to that, Harsanyi (1956) had already played the role of the interpreter of a game theoretical model for the wide audience of economists by demonstrating that Nash's bargaining model was mathematically equivalent to the earlier model proposed by the economist Frederik Zeuthen (1930) . The immediate consequence was that Nash's contribution, albeit expressed in a new formal language, was acknowledged as fully integrated in the body of economics.
It is well known that Nash's interest in economics was quite incidental (Leonard 1994, 497) . His only training in economic theory was an undergraduate course in international economics in 1948, which inspired 2. Ken Binmore and Partha Dasgupta (1987, 8; emphasis in original) single out this characteristic of Nash's model as essential: "Within the Nash program, each of these and other cooperative solution concepts are seen as an attempt to describe the outcome of a non-cooperative negotiation game without formalizing the negotiation procedure." his fi rst article on bargaining theory (Nash 1950) . Thus, it is not surprising that the publications granting him the Nobel Prize are almost entirely devoid of economic references. His two articles founding strategic bargaining theory (Nash 1950 (Nash , 1953 make no exception. This lack of empirical references is explained very simply by the fi rst lines of The Bargaining Problem: "In order to give a theoretical treatment of bargaining situations we abstract from the situation to form a mathematical model in terms of which to develop the theory" (Nash 1950, 156) . Basically, what Nash expunged from his model was exactly the core of the bargaining problem, namely, the process of negotiation through which an agreement is eventually reached. 2 Harsanyi's proof intended to show that the reintroduction of the negotiation procedure, such as the one postulated by Zeuthen, did not modify the bargaining solution determined axiomatically by Nash. The consequence was that the adoption of a new formal method could more concisely produce the same outcome given by traditional price theory. Before Nash, bargaining was usually modeled in terms of successive steps mimicking the price adjustment process. This approach, dating back to Francis Edgeworth (1881) and developed by Zeuthen (1930) , John Hicks (1932) , and A. C. Pigou (1932) was ignored by Nash, who solved the bargaining problem by means of two different and complementary methods. The fi rst was the axiomatic defi nition of bargainers' rational expectations, and the second was the reduction of the bargaining cooperative game to a noncooperative game that was solvable by means of equilibrium points. Harsanyi (1956) named the fi rst approach the theory of bargaining with given threats and the second the theory of optimal threats, but contrary to what was to become the standard view, he assumed that the latter followed from the former, and this was the object of his proof as described below. Zeuthen (1930) determines a solution to the bargaining process by postulating a sequence of concessions made by the bargainer who is less willing to incur the risk of a disagreement. If bargainers 1 and 2, respectively, demand a 1 and a 2 , which give utilities u 1 (a 1 ) > u 1 (a 2 ) and u 2 (a 2 ) < u 2 (a 1 ), and the bargainers assess p 1 and p 2 as the probabilities that the opponent will reject the respective demands, then bargainer 1 will fi nd it advantageous to insist on demand a 1 only if
Similarly, bargainer 2 will insist on demand a 2 if
If these two ratios are known by both bargainers, it can be imposed that bargainer 1 will lower his demand a 1 if
Otherwise bargainer 2 lowers his demand a 2 . Lastly, Zeuthen assumes that each concession is large enough to reverse the inequality sign and hence to determine a concession by the other bargainer. In this way the agreement is determined, provided that demands are measured in indivisible units. Harsanyi (1956) fi rst shows algebraically that Zeuthen's solution is the maximized product of the utilities gained by the bargainers, which is exactly what Nash's solution would result in. By algebraic manipulation, the inequality (3) can be written:
Consequently, it can be derived that the sequence of concessions stops when the product of the utilities associated to the agreement is maximized.
Then, Harsanyi derives axiomatically the key assumption of Zeuthen's model: the bargainer who is less willing to risk a confl ict is the bargainer who will make a concession. The proof is based on four axioms: perfect knowledge, monotonity of the probabilities p 1 and p 2 with respect to the bargainers' utility gains, expected-utility maximization, and symmetry.
In light of its methodological implications, it is the last axiom that merits attention: "The bargaining parties will follow identical (symmetric) rules of behaviour (whether because they follow the same principles of rational behaviour or because they are subject to the same psychological laws)." This defi nition is so glossed in the footnote: "This postulate is here equivalent to the assumption which we would express on the common-sense level by saying that each party will make a concession at a given stage of the negotiations if and only if he thinks he has at least as much reason as his opponent has to yield ground at that point" (Harsanyi 1956, 149 ; emphasis in original). The word "reason" in italics would ask for further explanation. It is indeed evident that the axiom involves a key methodological issue that Harsanyi emphasizes by claiming that Nash's 3. In a footnote, Harsanyi (1956, 149) adds the following remark: "The present writer feels that this aspect of Nash's approach deserved greater emphasis than it received in Nash's original exposition." theory of, as Harsanyi calls it, bargaining with given threats is just a generalization of the principle of symmetry.
3 Not surprisingly, Harsanyi comes back again to this point in the following years with arguments that deserve to be examined closely. Before doing this though, it is useful to take a step back to Nash's original contribution.
The axiom of symmetry was introduced by Nash in his fi rst article and was deemed as a necessary condition to determine the solution of the bargaining game. Nash's comment on the axiom is laconic: it "expresses equality of bargaining skill" (Nash 1950, 159) . Nash (1953, 137-38 ; emphases in original) extends and modifi es this defi nition:
The symmetry axiom, Axiom IV, says that the only signifi cant (in determining the value of the game) differences between the players are those which are included in the mathematical description of the game, which includes their different sets of strategies and utility functions. One may think of Axiom IV as requiring the players to be intelligent and rational beings. But we think it is a mistake to regard this as expressing equal bargaining ability of the players, in spite of a statement to this effect in The Bargaining Problem. With people who are suffi ciently intelligent and rational there should not be any question of bargaining ability, a term which suggests something like skill in duping the other fellow. The usual haggling process is based on imperfect information, the hagglers trying to propagandize each other into misconceptions of the utilities involved. Our assumption of complete information makes such an attempt meaningless.
In this way, Nash explicitly assumes that besides being perfectly informed, players have to be equally intelligent and rational to fi nd an agreement. This condition has two consequences. First, it enables one to select a unique outcome, which would otherwise be indeterminate, by means of the mere mathematical description of the game. Second, the outcome of the bargaining game ceases to depend on the negotiation process and becomes the necessary result of the initial comparison of demands as captured by the maximization of the utility functions. Both these consequences immediately appeal to Harsanyi, who strictly adopts Nash's later interpretation based on the assumption of complete infor-mation. Throughout his career, Harsanyi focused his attention more on analytical generality than on descriptive validity, an inclination that Myerson (2001, 20-21) attributes to his history as a refugee: "The madness of the Nazi and Communist systems which had persecuted him cried out for explanation. He responded in his own way, not by dwelling on the social evils that he had experienced, but by working systematically to reconstruct the logical foundations of social theory, so that people in the future might better understand the dynamics of social institutions."
Five years after the equivalence proof, Harsanyi (1961, 185 ) discusses again the symmetry axiom in an article on cooperative game theory, but in this context it assumes a slightly different meaning:
Postulate 4 [symmetry] is also based on the principle that the two players expect each other to act rationally. Its purpose is to exclude bargaining strategies that a given player could adopt only on the expectation that the other player would follow a different, and less rational, bargaining strategy. In particular, it wants to rule out that a player should act on the expectation that a rational opponent would make a concession in a situation in which he himself, following his own criteria of rational behavior, would refuse to make a concession. This is the equivalent of saying that a solution to the bargaining game (i.e., the equilibrium) can be defi ned only if each player's expectations of the other player's behavior are correct. This result depends on two conditions. The fi rst condition is that those expectations can be correctly assessed-and that can happen only if each player conjectures that the counterpart thinks exactly like himself or herself. It is the defi nition of rationality that guarantees this outcome, in that it selects maximizing behavior and excludes any other kind of behavior. The second condition is even harder to meet. Players are assumed to be identical for all the relevant variables of the model:
As any theory must apply to both players, if the two players happen to be equal with respect to all relevant independent variables they must be assigned full equality also with respect to the dependent variables, i.e., with respect to the outcome. But this is precisely what the symmetry postulate says. Different theories of bargaining may differ in what variables they regard as the relevant independent variables-but, if the two players are equal on all variables regarded by the theory as relevant, the theory must allot both players the same payoffs. (Harsanyi 1961, 189; emphases in original) 4. The other new axiom (the sixth) of mutually expected rationality is also formally superfl uous because it imposes "that players expect each other to follow decision rules consistent with the present postulates" (Harsanyi 1961, 184 ).
In the same article, the meaning of this revised interpretation is emphasized by a modifi ed proof of the equivalence between Zeuthen's and Nash's models. Two more postulates are added, although they appear redundant. The fi fth axiom, which is called restriction of variables, imposes that bargainers' decisions are dependent only on the variables implied by the other axioms. In Harsanyi's (1961, 185) words:
Postulate 5 serves to exclude, from the players' decision rules, irrelevant variables extraneous to our rationality postulates. If we dropped postulate 5, our remaining fi ve postulates would not rule out some quite arbitrary, or even silly, decision rules. For instance, it would be quite compatible with our other fi ve postulates that the players should divide any joint profi t in proportion to their telephone numbers, or in proportion to the logarithms of their waist measurements, etc.
Harsanyi's subtly ironical vein is revealing. The introduction of a specifi c postulate whose sole purpose is to restate the others cannot be justifi ed by mere formal arguments. 4 A more convincing reason for infl ating the model of an unnecessary axiom can be found in the debate raised within the scientifi c community by Nash's bargaining model. Signifi cantly, Harsanyi (1961, 88) stresses the symmetry axiom's importance by claiming that in the 1956 proof it was subsumed within the assumption of symmetry, but the 1961 decision to keep it separate is the result of its being the really crucial assumption. This is because our model differs mainly from alternative theories of bargaining, such as Raiffa's, Braithwaite's, and Schelling's, in making the two parties' bargaining strategies dependent only on a restricted set of variables which are directly relevant for the rational pursuit of individual utility by the two parties-whereas Raiffa and Braithwaite make the two parties' strategies dependent on certain ethical criteria, and Schelling makes them dependent on certain psychological considerations. In our model these ethical and psychological variables are excluded by the restriction-of-variables postulate.
To better explain what Harsanyi intended to distance himself from, it is opportune to outline what the contribution of Schelling consists of.
5. David Kreps (1990, 101) claims that, although Schelling's treatment of the criteria for selecting multiple equilibria remains the most stimulating discussion of this issue in game theory, "little to no progress has been made in exploring Schelling's insights." See also Crawford 1991; Binmore, Osborne, and Rubinstein 1992; Myerson 2001; and Sugden 2001. 
Schelling's Empiricism as the Basis for a Theory of Confl ict
A common view in the historical assessment of Schelling's contribution to economics is that, notwithstanding the recent award of the Nobel Prize, his insights have not been fully developed yet. 5 A reason for this was highlighted by two reviews of Schelling's book Strategy of Confl ict, one written by Robert Bishop and one by Martin Shubik and published, respectively, in the American Economic Review and the Journal of Political Economy. In their fi rst remarks, both reviewers address the fact that the content of the book is hard to classify. In regard to Schelling's informal use of game theory, Bishop (1961, 674 ) fi rst comments: "Game theory is too important and too rich a topic to be left exclusively to the mathematicians. Though never stated quite so bluntly, this seems to be the central unifying theme of the present collection of essays." Shubik (1961, 502) , on the other hand, denies that any relation exists between the book and game theory: "It is my opinion that this book would have been a much stronger contribution had most of the references to game theory been deleted. Although the formal structure of that topic could have been of considerable assistance to the type of analysis presented by Schelling, there is little evidence that it has been used." Both reviewers subsequently go on to argue that the interdisciplinary nature of the book is such that economists ascribe it to the fi eld of game theorists, and game theorists to the fi eld of economists. Ultimately, this aspect is judged critically by Shubik: "Its weakness lies in the author's apparent lack of appreciation of the power of the methodology which has already been developed and which could have been of considerable use in furthering his own analysis" (502).
Judgments such as these point out that Schelling was immediately perceived as an outsider. His intellectual originality and his inclination to an interdisciplinary view were far from the common way of thinking among economists at the time. Although he began his career as an economist in a traditional fashion by joining fi rst the economics faculty at Yale and then by becoming professor of economics at Harvard in 1958, after that he constantly focused on problems that were considered outside the traditional domains of economics (Zeckhauser 1989, 163) . Even his view of game theory as "valuable not as 'instant theory' just waiting to be applied but as a framework" (Schelling 1967, 238) was far from the way economists like Shubik intended to use the new mathematics of von Neumann and Morgenstern.
His theory of confl ict made no exception to this nonconventional view, in spite of its being farsighted in its methodological foundations:
We seriously restrict ourselves by the assumption of rational behaviornot just of intelligent behavior, but of behavior motivated by a conscious calculation of advantages, a calculation that in turn is based on an explicit and internally consistent value system. . . . The advantage of cultivating the area of strategy for theoretical development is not that, of all possible approaches, it is the one that evidently stays closest to the truth, but that the assumption of rational behavior is a productive one. (Schelling 1960, 4; emphasis in original) This starting point of Schelling's was consistent with the yet-to-come rational approach to economics, but it was mitigated by the awareness that it is not a universal advantage in situations of confl ict to be inalienably and manifestly rational in decision and motivation. Many of the attributes of rationality, as in several illustrations mentioned earlier, are strategic disabilities in certain confl ict situations. It may be perfectly rational to wish oneself not altogether rational, or-if that language is philosophically objectionable-to wish for the power to suspend certain rational capabilities in particular situations. (18) The consequences of this methodological foundation could not but be unconventional. A nonexhaustive list includes the proposal of focal points as a solution to the equilibrium selection problem, the proof of the rationality of irrevocable commitments, and the foundation of bargaining theory as an empirical and experimental-based theory.
One motif that runs through the whole of Schelling's 1960 book is the question of how one person can make another believe something. Indeed, even when dealing with the problem of equilibrium selection, Schelling seeks to provide an answer to this question. As he puts it, game theory is empirically signifi cant if it takes into account real strategic environments that are characterized by two kinds of interdependency: the fi rst is that each player's best action depends on what he expects other players to do, the second is that each player tries to infl uence the other players' choices by trying to infl uence their expectations of his choices. If the latter kind of interdependency is taken into account, players coordinate their expectations by exploiting all the clues made available by the play of the game. Focal points are therefore the proposal of the concepts of shared prominence or salience for that purpose. If, by defi nition, focal points are strictly and irrevocably contingent on the actual conditions in which the game is played, it follows that not having a systematic arrangement of the focal point determinants is not a fl aw, but a necessary requisite of Schelling's theory:
People can often concert their intentions or expectations with others if each knows the other is trying to do the same. Most situationsperhaps every situation for people who are practiced at this kind of game-provide some clue for coordinating behavior, some focal point for each person's expectation of what the other expects him to expect to be expected to do. Finding the key, or rather fi nding a key-any key that is mutually recognized as the key becomes the key-may depend on imagination more than on logic; it may depend on analogy, precedent, accidental arrangement, symmetry, aesthetic or geometric confi guration, casuistic reasoning, and who the parties are and what they know about each other. (57; emphasis in original)
If one accepts that imagination matters more than logic in sharing beliefs, the determination of focal points becomes essentially an intuitive process that thus merits an empirical rather than analytical approach. 6 Schelling, in his book, discusses a long series of cases to draw the conclusion that there are no regularities at all. Nevertheless, this perspective enables him to select a paradoxical consequence. Namely, implicit coordination may work better than explicit coordination, since more information or communication may be disadvantageous if it detracts from the intrinsic magnetism of determinate outcomes.
Schelling uses a similar reasoning to prove the rationality of irrevocable commitments, a rationality that represents another empirically based paradox. According to Schelling, observation often shows that bargainers voluntarily and irreversibly sacrifi ce freedom of choice. He deems that this is the result of the fact that the power to constrain the other bargainer may depend on the possibility of binding oneself. Thus, the paradoxical consequence is that a lack of restrictions may become a source of weakness, while absence of freedom may imply strength.
7. Schelling's comment is related to the "robbers cave experiments" on intergroup confl ict and cooperation discussed by Muzafer Sherif (1958) . The other experiments mentioned by Schelling are discussed in Bavelas 1953 , Deutsch 1958 , Flood 1958 , and Osgood 1959 Schelling also applies this interpretation to situations of international negotiations. He points out how, in actual bargaining processes, one side can accept irrevocable commitments in a way that is patently visible to the other side. This tactic-which in the case of governments may depend on a binding public opinion-has the effect of squeezing the range of indeterminacy down to the point most favorable to the constrained party. Basically, this occurs because an action that increases the future cost of backing down from one's demand may effectively convince the other party that one is not in fact willing to retreat.
As a fi nal point, Schelling also contributes to laying the foundation of the strategic theory of bargaining as an empirical and experiment-based theory. His main motivation in doing so is the belief that deductive arguments cannot the whole work make. Schelling reasons that since the ultimate outcome of the bargaining is inherently linked to the negotiation process, it is the amount of contextual details included in the analysis that improves the solvability of a bargaining game. Schelling uses a two-player, nonzero-sum game to discuss this point. He illustrates that if there are two players and no pure opposition of interests, their behavior cannot stem from a priori considerations, because neither introspection nor axiomatic reasoning can successfully come to a solution. Thus, in this case, the decisions of two interacting centers of consciousness cannot be predicted without relying on empirical evidence. This empiricist view led Schelling fairly naturally to embrace laboratory testing as a useful tool for the economist. In the 1950s the fi rst economic experiments, mainly promoted by game theorists, had started to disclose some unknown properties of real behavior, also challenging basic assumptions of theoretical economics. This unconventional orientation was promptly perceived as fruitful by Schelling, who dedicated a whole chapter of his 1960 book to discuss the usefulness of laboratory activity for economists. What Schelling emphasized is the fact that experimental work helps set the rules for players to use when learning to coordinate their choices in playing the game. Evidence in the lab shows that in the absence of preexisting rules of behavior, subjects create new norms through a process of learning, in which each player's developing norm infl uences the others.
7 This process may contribute to solving the unpredictability of the game by taking into account all necessary factors for determining a solution, including unconscious behavior. In this way experimental work can be valuable for defi ning principles that are relevant to rational play yet are not derivable analytically. This approach of bearing psychological variables and actual behavior in mind, with all the multifaceted components therein, was so pronounced that not only did it attract the critical attention of Harsanyi pointed out at the end of the previous section, but it also set off the controversy on the axiom of symmetry.
The Debate on the Axiom of Symmetry
The main criticism directed at the assumption of symmetry by the earlier reviewers of Nash's model was that it could be accepted only as an ethical criterion. This view was shared by R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa (1957) in their infl uential book Games and Decisions, as well as by Harvey Wagner (1957 Wagner ( , 1958 and Shubik (1959) , and reprised by Bishop (1963) in a later survey on game theoretical models of bargaining. Luce and Raiffa's arguments are worth citing and serve as representative of the dominant view. Their close scrutiny of Nash's model points out three major criticisms: (1) that the available observational and experimental evidence shows that the model has dubious predictive value; (2) that its implications are also ethically questionable in that its criteria of fairness is quite context dependent; and (3) that the assumption of players who are perfectly informed of each other's utility functions is particularly inappropriate in a bargaining game where players' strategies often strive to falsify personal preferences. Luce and Raiffa (1957, 136 ) make the same criticisms of Harsanyi's proof of the Nash-Zeuthen equivalence, which Luce and Raiffa consider valid only as an arbitration scheme, with a descriptive validity that is seriously questionable. This matter is addressed by Schelling in a paper titled For the Abandonment of Symmetry in Game Theory, which was fi rst published in 1959 and then included as an appendix in his 1960 book. Schelling's opinion is quite different from that of his contemporaries. Not only does he not ascribe a normative value to the axiom, but he criticizes it for two different reasons: fi rst, the axiom converts a cooperative bargaining game into a tacit noncooperative game; second, symmetry is only one of the many possible clues for determining a rational solution to the game.
As regards the fi rst criticism, Schelling argues that a bargaining game cannot be exclusively defi ned by its normal form. This holds true also for Nash's (1953) model with variable threats, because once the payoffs are known, the sequence of moves still has to be specifi ed. In any case the negotiation process, according to Schelling, has to include a fi nal period in which players make their last offers. With the symmetry postulate, each player should make his or her offer without knowing the other player's offer. Once time for communication has expired, the bargaining game turns into a tacit game. If this tacit game has a predictable and effi cient solution, each player will have an optimal strategy, which is to wait for the last period without reaching an agreement and then converge on the solution of the tacit game. It is indeed rational to expect that the other symmetrical player will give nothing further than this. But, following along these lines, the cooperative feature of the bargaining game is rendered for the most part irrelevant. Schelling's conclusion is that a bargaining model in which, by virtue of the symmetry assumption, neither preplay communication nor binding agreement play a role cannot be considered a valuable tool.
To support this interpretation, Schelling (1960, 276) uses the metaphor of a race in which all the runners know that they are equally fast. If the race is certain to end in a tie, the runners do not bother to run: "The perfectly move-symmetrical cooperative game seems a little like that foot race. Bargaining in the one case is as unavailing as leg-work in the other; every player knows in advance that all moves and tactics are foredoomed to neutralization by the symmetrical potentialities available to his opponent."
Schelling's second critical remark concerns the fact that even if symmetry may permit actual bargainers to converge on a unique solution, convergence is not a necessary consequence of the rationality postulate, as Harsanyi claims. Schelling argues that the axiom is twofold. On one side it imposes that each player does not concede more than he would expect to obtain if he were in the opponent's place. On the other side it implies that each player's perception of symmetry is the only basis for his expectation of what he would concede if he were in the other's position. Harsanyi seems to be aware of only the fi rst meaning, which Schelling calls the rational-solution postulate, but he appears to only implicitly assume the second meaning, the symmetry postulate. What Schelling counterargues is that any alternative division may be rational if it is consistent in terms of shared expectations. For example, the unfair division of 80/20 may be justifi ed if both bargainers see a sign on a blackboard suggesting this proportion or if previous players had agreed on it. Although mathematical sym-8. In the fi rst lines of the paper, Harsanyi (1961, 179) writes: "The purpose of this paper is to re-state and re-examine the rationality postulates underlying the theory of cooperative games. It is also proposed to discuss T. C. Schelling's recent criticism of some game-theoretical postulates, in particular the symmetry postulate." metry is a useful expedient for fi nding a solution, its rationality depends on the absence of other available alternatives to focus players' attention on. Indeed, the criteria for choosing an option are not related to mathematical appeal, but rather to introspection and empirical observation.
Paradoxically, this interpretation implies that Harsanyi's and Nash's models postulate some degree of limitation in players' processing capacities: "The identifi cation of symmetry with rationality rests on the assumption that there are certain intellectual processes that rational players are incapable of, namely, concerting choices on the basis of anything other than mathematical symmetry, and that rational players should know this" (Schelling 1960, 285) . In light of this, Schelling's criticism implies that Nash's axiomatic approach is not based on the abstract assumption of players' rationality, but on the empirically wrong assumption that mathematical symmetry dominates all the other possible clues as to how tacitly rational players' expectations may converge on a unique solution.
Signifi cantly enough, Harsanyi's (1961) reply to Schelling is contained in an article titled On the Rationality Postulates Underlying the Theory of Cooperative Games.
8 His fi rst argument is that their disagreement depends on their being focused on two different games. Schelling's analysis concerns a kind of game in which players can commit themselves in advance to a certain specifi ed demand and stick to it even in the event of disagreement. In this case, ultimatums are effective in reaching a solution only if the penalty is so harsh that any breaking of the commitment would be unprofi table. Here the rational strategy for the proponent player is to demand the maximum admissible share, since it will not be in the responder's interests to reject it as long as it leaves him better off than if no agreement is reached at all. Harsanyi, as well as Nash, considers a different game in which the payoffs in case of disagreement are deterministically fi xed by the rules of the game. It is this lack of alternative retaliatory strategies that renders the outcome independent of the rather accidental features of the communication system between the bargainers. In these games, the axiom of symmetry does not imply, as Schelling claims, that the bargaining game degenerates into a tacit noncooperative game. If the players have the same possibilities of communication, there is no benefi t in their waiting for the very last moment before proposing an agreement. This is because the axiom of symmetry prevents rational players from insisting on extreme demands that will likely turn out to be incompatible. In Harsanyi's view, the optimal strategy for selfi sh players is to search for a compromise that has to be defi ned independently on ethical principles.
Harsanyi also replies to Schelling's second criticism. He argues that the unfair 80/20 division can be justifi ed only by additional environmental variables, such as blackboard signs or precedents explicitly introduced by Schelling. He goes on to say that the key difference between their approaches is not due to the symmetry postulate, but rather to the restriction-of-variables postulate, which rules out other factors as well. The axiom of symmetry imposes that each party's strategy depends on additional variables only if one party believes that the other's strategy would depend on these same variables. If all the relevant independent variables and the psychological laws governing behavior are taken as common among all bargainers, it follows that there is no rational outcome other than the Nash-Zeuthen solution.
Harsanyi's concluding remarks concern the defi nition of the rational theory of bargaining. The purpose of the theory is not to show what solution is preferable according to any given exogenous criterion, but to predict and to explain the outcome of actual bargaining behavior. As Harsanyi (1961, 193) puts it, although irrational behavior may sometimes play a role, in "many cases, at least" it has "only marginal signifi cance." He concedes that the effort to link strategic interaction and bargaining theory by means of the assumption of symmetry has essentially a normative purpose. But the same can be said for most game theoretical models designed to describe how ideally rational players would act. In order for these models to work in an empirical science like economics, it has to be believed that the assumption of rational and perfectly informed players-Nash's intelligent and rational bargainers-has some descriptive value and helps to explain facts. Thus, game theory provides a benchmark for explaining actual bargaining processes only if players pursue goal-seeking orientation to a high degree and in a particularly consistent manner.
It is made also clear by this last point that the defi nition of rationality is the crucial problem raised by the controversy on the symmetry axiom. Thus, the historical meaning of the controversy can be better appreciated by focusing on the underlying methodological issues.
A fi rst theme is related to the implications of symmetry for the conception of the individual. If different bargainers are formally treated as if they were not distinguishable one from the other, the model abstracts from 9. In the 1960s, Harsanyi (1962, 33; emphases in original) seemed to believe that the exercise of imagining opponents' reasoning in a bargaining process may also be based on a common social and cultural framework: "On the one hand it is conceivable that in a given society with well-established cultural traditions people tend to enter bargaining situations with more or less consistent expectations about each other's utility functions. It may happen that all members of a given society are expected to have essentially the same utility function. Or, more realistically, we may assume that at least persons of a given sex, age, social position, education, etc. are expected to have similar functions of a specifi ed sort." This view also assumed a Cold War fl avor: "In the case of bargaining between Communist and non-Communist powers all of these diffi culties seem to appear in rather extreme form" (38). real individuals and typifi es them into artifi cial beings. Such an assumption is consonant with the neoclassical concept of representative agent, which does not necessarily commit to the hypothesis that all agents in the population are identical, due to the fact that they are univocally defi ned and differentiated in terms of their preferences. Game theory adopts the same abstract view of the individual without defi ning the identity of the players, who are described solely in terms of strategies available to them. Nash's theory too explicitly endorsed this view. Since the 1950s, Harsanyi was more sympathetic toward a different interpretation, which anticipates what Aumann (1976) later identifi es as the Harsanyi doctrine. The doctrine states that the only way for a player to predict other players' strategies is to rely on his own thoughts and calculations. When individual beliefs are the posteriors they form from a common prior assumption given their private information, introspection becomes the best tool to predict other players' beliefs. This approach, however, does not resolve the problem of how the common prior is formed, 9 although it permits erecting game theory on the assumption of common knowledge. On the other hand, Schelling deals with strategically interactive environments in quite a different way. His theory of confl ict is based on the hypothesis that bargainers may have different abilities and divergent expectations and consequently adopt different strategies. Coordination cannot just be a matter of guessing what an average man does, because only by assuming players' heterogeneity does interaction become fully strategic. The task of forming and coordinating players' expectations cannot be left solely to introspection or to externally defi ned social conventions, but has to be accomplished within the endogenously originated framework, where the bargaining game is strategically played. The consequence of this view is that there is no deterministic way to defi ne either the equilibrium solution or the rational behavior.
Indeed, the multiplicity of solutions is another key issue raised by the debate. Harsanyi's most recurrent argument in support of Nash's model is that it determines a single solution to the bargaining game. Nash (1953, 136) describes the process leading him to select this solution in the following way: "Rather than solve the two person cooperative game by analyzing the bargaining process, one can attack the problem axiomatically by stating general properties that any reasonable solution should possess. By specifying enough such properties one excludes all but one solution." Harsanyi (1961, 190) stresses the importance of the method by reversing its sequence: if the relevant independent variable alone allows for the defi ning of a unique rational solution, there is no need to consider other variables except those "intrinsically irrelevant for utility maximization." This emphasis is a consequence of the focus on the effi ciency properties of the fi nal outcome. In Nash's model, bargainers communicate only by addressing demands to each other without any explicit process of commitment, and players' bargaining power is axiomatically determined. On the other hand, Schelling's theory of confl ict considers players' bargaining power as an endogenous variable dependent on what happens in, rather than out of, the negotiation process. In games with multiple equilibria, it is assumed that players learn what is convenient to do by relying on directly relevant past experiences or clues given by the actual bargaining process. For instance, in Schelling's discussion bargainers do not try to assess the opponent's estimate of the risk of a confl ict as in Zeuthen 1930 , but try to affect it by means of all available means. Bargaining becomes a subtle communication game, where messages and information conveyed during the whole negotiation process are instrumental in determining the fi nal outcome. It is also clear that in such a game the moves that each player makes to ascertain the preferences of the opponent become relevant. This situation, which Nash and Harsanyi avoid by assuming complete information, is taken explicitly into account by Schelling. For example, each bargainer may try to conceal his or her own preferences, or may reveal false preferences to manipulate the other. Or he or she may acquire information by observing the other's actions. As Schelling sees it, the attempts to manipulate the bargaining environment are often aimed at rendering other player's choices more predictable by infl uencing them. This corresponds to gaining as much infl uence or leverage over other players' behavior as possible also by controlling the information used by them. It is evident how this process directly affects players' relative power and makes the solution endogenously determined.
Schelling's strongest criticism of Harsanyi, however, is that there isn't a unique and mechanical way to defi ne rationality. The only way to defi ne an unambiguous rational criterion of choice for strategic environments is to rely on the process through which players learn to predict other players' choices. While Harsanyi assumes that all rational players make the same maximizing choices under the same circumstances, Schelling points out that the use of the maximization principle may not always be rational. Rational bargainers consequently are not constrained to adopt only one pattern of behavior. This view is in stark contrast with the 1970s shift to the noncooperative approach that made game theoretical application to economics strictly dependent on Nash equilibrium. Nash assumes that players are endowed with perfect knowledge and unlimited computational power, while bypassing the problem of determining why they should come to play their equilibrium strategies (Giocoli 2004) . In this setting, Schelling's theory was simply unfi t to be accepted within mainstream economics.
To summarize the methodological content of the Harsanyi-Schelling debate, the assumption of symmetry plays a key role in the foundation and in the subsequent developments of the rational theory of strategic bargaining. First, the axiom enables one to sidestep the main problem of strategic interaction, that is, to avoid defi ning the process through which players form their expectations of opponents' behavior. The theory considers only the end state of the equilibrium and ignores the negotiation process. Second, it extends the abstract assumption of representative agent, which is a constitutive notion of neoclassical economics, to bargaining theory. Third, it enables one to solve the problems associated with the multiplicity of equilibria by selecting a unique solution to the bargaining problem.
Conclusions
This article has argued that the Harsanyi-Schelling debate on the assumption of symmetry was a historically signifi cant episode for the evolution of bargaining theory. Contrary to most reviewers of Nash's bargaining model, Schelling did not consider the axiom suitable only as an ethical criterion. Schelling criticized it without rejecting Harsanyi's rational approach, but showed its inadequacy by means of counterexamples and paradoxes. His approach of taking into account the empirical content of theory pushed him to consider the framework in which the bargaining game is played as the direct object of analysis. Normative precepts, therefore, were eventually built upon the features of the actual environment in which they apply. The assumption of symmetry was consequently seen by Schelling as a device to exclude the negotiation process from the bargaining model. In this way, the key issue of the learning through which each player defi nes his expectations of the behavior of the counterpart was ignored. In place of this, Harsanyi extended the neoclassical assumption of the representative agent to bargaining theory and removed any heterogeneity among players. These assumptions lead to a unique outcome to the bargaining game, but there is a high cost for this way out. First, bargaining theory must be taken back within the realm of static analysis by excluding any dynamic adjustment or correction of these expectations over time. Second, empirical signifi cance has to be subtracted from the model. This debate also helps to explain why Nash's bargaining model has come to exert a great infl uence on recent work and why the axiomatic approach prevailed over other ways of strategically modeling the bargaining process. On one hand, Harsanyi is the economist who permitted the application of game theory to situations in which the players lack complete information about each other or the rules of the game. The common prior assumption that he proposed to deal with this issue is probably the most pervasive assumption in the economics of information and is strictly related to Harsanyi's interpretation of the axiom of symmetry. Moreover, it allowed for the introduction in bargaining theory of the same assumption of strong rationality that characterizes the noncooperative solution concept, namely, Nash equilibrium. All bargainers are assumed to be perfect maximizers on the basis that their opponents are too. In this way their strategic behavior becomes easily predictable, and solutions can be defi ned axiomatically by evading the issue of the empirical plausibility of their theories.
On the other hand, Schelling's work on bargaining theory has not been fully developed, mainly because it adopted a multifaceted defi nition of rationality. If players do not share exactly the same pattern of behavior, outcomes become indeterminate in an abstract framing of analysis. The process of fi nding an agreement in a bargaining process, similar to that of selecting the equilibrium in a noncooperative game, has a component that is inherently empirical because it concerns a process of intellectual coordination among heterogeneous agents where the context is decisive. This alternative path tries to preserve strategic interaction in its complexity, but it greatly contrasts with the post-1970s emphasis on perfectly informed and fully rational economic agents and on equilibrium analysis.
Finally, these arguments show that bargaining, more than other research areas, is a problematic issue for economists. It highlights well the anomalies contained in the generally agreed-on defi nition of rationality and in the surreptitious division between formalized and empirical arguments characterizing mainstream economics. More generally, in light of the fact that bargaining theory is not presently considered a fl ourishing research area by game theorists themselves, this historical account shows that to ground a new research fi eld on highly stylized assumptions and on the early achievement of determinate solutions as the primary goal is not necessarily the best strategy in order to improve the future effi cacy of a research program.
